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TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: ETHICS OF RESPONSIBILITY  
The article is devoted to the ways of problematization of the ethical category of 
responsibility within philosophy of technology as a response to increasing 
technological power of the mankind 
“Finally liberated Prometheus given the unprecedented strength by science 
and indefatigable incentive by economy, calls for the ethics constraining his power 
with voluntary bonds” [3, p. 3] is the beginning of H. Jonas’ book titled “The 
Imperative of Responsibility. In search of an ethics for the technological age” 
causing a resonance far outside a circle of professional philosophers. 
Lack of interest to the problem of responsibility till the XIX century reveals 
the peripheral and coordinated status of this ethical notion in philosophical 
researches. The honor to be called the ancestor of ethics of responsibility could be 
given to M. Weber, who in his researches opposed it to I. Kant’s "ethics of belief". 
In Kant’s ethics responsibility is connected only with the internal life of an actor. In 
Weber's ethics of responsibility the main emphasis is placed on expected 
consequences of actions.  
The scope of responsibility in both concepts is limited to present and past 
without taking into account the remote consequences of man’s activity as one ethical 
concept deals with the motive of an action while the other – with the direct result. It 
should be noted that in many ethical traditions (evdemonizm ethics, ethical egoism, 
utilitarianism) responsibility extends only for the consequences of man’s activity in 
foreseeable prospect. Thereof the concept of responsibility assumes the moral 
obligation for interpersonal relationships, as a duty imputed by the moral law in the 
face of present and past. 
In the XXth c. the problem of responsibility is rethought because of changes 
in nature of man’s activity in technological era. Among apologists of the new 
concept of responsibility G. Picht, G. Anders, H. Jonas, X. Lenk should be named. 
The basis of refreshing is man’s new attitude to opportunities of his own freedom 
guaranteed to him by technology. H. Blumenberg notes that technology is "a new 
dimension in man – world relationship rather than a realm of definite objects 
emerging as a result of man’s activity" [1, p. 81]. 
Activity of The Club of Rome, official declarations and agreements had 
essential impact on development of the new concept of responsibility. In particular, 
one can mention the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs urging 
scientists to reveal hidden dangers concealed in modern unprecedented development 
of science and technology; Russell-Einstein's manifesto (1955); Mount Carmel 
Declaration on Technology and Moral Responsibility (1974); conference in 
Asilomar, the USA (1975); ethical codes of technical-engineering associations. 
Х. Lenk distinguishes the types of responsibility, following the theory of a 
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well-known English lawyer G. Hart. On an equal basis with causal responsibility 
(for done actions), role responsibility (caused by duties or competences), X. Lenk 
mentions moral responsibility which has the universal importance [4]. 
X. Lenk defines relations of responsibility as: 
 – somebody: the subject of responsibility, the carrier (personality/ 
corporation) is, 
 – for: something (acts, consequences of acts, states, tasks, etc.), 
 – in relation to: some addressee, 
 – in the face of: defined (authorizing and taking out judgments) instance, 
 – according to: concrete (prescriptive, standard) criterion, 
 – within: definite area of man’s responsibility and his acts [4]. 
Uniqueness of the modern moral situation is caused by expansion of the 
sphere of collective actions, accumulation of results of technological change of the 
world, increase of their scale and irreversibility. All the mentioned demands revision 
of traditional ethical categories, creation of the new ethics, new scale of 
responsibility. Classical ethics directly or indirectly is based on several inseparably 
ideas: 
1. The fundamental principle of traditional ethics is the belief that man’s 
nature and the nature of things in their essential properties are invariable and 
invulnerable. Due to the development of technology the mankind realized that the 
nature is vulnerable, its resources are limited, including ability to self-restoration. 
Achievements of modern technology testify that Homo faber has turned himself into 
the object of technology. Artificial maintenance of life, genetic control of future 
generations, cloning and transplantation of artificial organs are the things able to 
change drastically our ideas of mans’ nature and the boundary between physis and 
techne in his life. Almost boundless man’s power over the nature and his own 
essence demands man’s responsibility for the invariance of his own nature and 
existence of mankind. 
2. Another fundamental idea of traditional ethics is connected with ignoring 
of remote effects of man’s activity. Preceding ethical requirements, including both 
golden rule and categorical imperative, foresee certain absolutes or some invariable 
properties of man’s nature, appealing to which it is possible to specify criteria of 
morality of an act, significant at any temporal and spatial coordinate of the Universe. 
Theorists of new ethics of responsibility affirm that the kind of ethics focused on the 
changing world is needed: "If morality is created for man, instead of man for 
morality, ethics can't deny its orientation to consequences" [5, p. 376]. 
3. The idea of an invariance and eternity of the nature carved paradigmatic 
features of the preceding ethical tradition. First of all, its "vertical" orientation on 
transcendent highest good, the ontological correlate of which is the idea of 
completeness, true, eternal life. Most fully this theory is presented into Plato's 
philosophy. The theory reveals itself in Kant’s ethical heritage, whose "regulative 
idea", to H. Jonas’ opinion, is an equivalent to Plato’s "idea of the good", as well as 
in Hegel's system, with that only difference that the "vertical" orientation was 
replaced with "horizontal" aspiration of self-developing spirit to the completeness. 
This installation is to be overcome with ethics of responsibility: it isn't necessary to 
look for the good-in-itself somewhere out of the world or at the end of history; it is 
9.130
necessary to prove the value of present temporary and changeable life. 
As the knowledge of consequences acquires the moral sense and becomes a 
prime debt of the mankind, there is a problem of anticipation of the remote 
consequences of collective activity and their forecasting. According to H. Jonas’ 
opinion, the principle of "fear heuristics" ought to be the decisive principle in 
science, economy and policy.  
Without calling into question the axiological and ontological priority of 
good and "preferred" values, H. Jonas demands to focus attention of ethics on what 
we would like to avoid. Heuristic function of fear estimating possible consequences 
of any action implies the demand to take into account the evil which it can cause. A. 
Ermolenko says that H. Jonas has represented a new type of fear, "it is both 
existential fear of anything (Angst) which is a source of man’s ability to possible 
freedom, and the fear of something concrete, fear which is tied to the world (Furcht). 
For example, the fear of a nuclear catastrophe" [3, p. 376]. 
Development of ideas of possible remote consequences of collective practice 
as well as the moral debt interweaved into it (refusal of actions, consequence of 
which can threaten mankind’s existence) is explications of the fundamental principle 
saying: "the mankind ought to exist". H. Jonas declares the following formulations 
of the imperative of ethics of responsibility: "Act in such a way that consequences of 
your action are in a consent with a continuity of true man’s life on Earth"; "Act in 
such a way that consequences of your action are not destructive for future possibility 
of man’s life"; "Include in your real choice the future man’s integrity as a co-object 
of your will". 
H. Jonas states that only this very imperative can apply for the status of the 
categorical one in Kant’ sense, that is really unconditional. First, this imperative 
doesn't have the formal character; its pithiness is based rather on the consequences 
of an action taking into account the continuation of man’s life in the future than on 
its self-coordination. Secondly, the new imperative is turned to political activity, in 
place of private behavior. Thirdly, the imperative demands to provide man’s future 
existence. Thus, along with the imputed responsibility connected with done actions 
causing the sense of guilt, H. Jonas reveals responsibility of the actions are to be 
done. 
There is the problem of justification of such an imperative. It is beyond both 
autonomous Kantian ethics, and any heteronomous ethical system. The ethical 
tradition has been focusing on the concept of moral action for ages. The problem 
why man in general is, is out of discussion for the traditional ethical thought. Being, 
including man’s being, is the subject of the metaphysics. The new imperative – the 
mankind ought to be – is both ethical and metaphysical. As this requirement deals 
with being and doesn’t imply the quality of a moral action, H. Jonas concludes that 
the justification of his imperative should be found not in traditional ethics, but in 
metaphysics within which the question why the mankind ought to be can be only 
raised. The attempt of justification is both interesting and vulnerable for criticism the 
part of ethics of responsibility. 
Thus, H. Jonas’ philosophical ethics is the ontological theory of values 
created and developed in contrast to the formal ethics, in particular to discourse, 
normative one. It means that the problem of justification is connected with a wider 
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one – the problem of correlation of material ethics of values and formal ethics of 
norms for the first time initiated by M. Scheler and actualized in the modern 
discussion of axiological conservatism and discursive ethics. 
While H. Jonas justifies responsibility by intuition and metaphysics, in 
discursive ethics (K.-O. Apel, J. Habermas, D. Beler, V. Kuhlman) responsibility is 
justified by norms of communication [2]. H. Jonas's concept and discursive ethics  
are two paradigmatic answers to the problem of justification of the phenomenon of 
"responsibility". At the same time, two approaches – transcendent, ontological-
axiological and transcendental, normative ones don't exclude each other. In such 
complementarity ontological ethics of values would be necessary for substantial and 
motivational components while a reflection concerning the principles and a 
discourse concerning justification of norms could be a logical component. 
This thesis could be operational, in particular, at estimation of consequences 
of one or another economic, scientific or engineering project. The value of being 
concerning non-being demands our preference of negative forecasts and fear 
heuristics. However the procedure of clearing of negative consequences should be 
carried out in the framework of a discourse which wouldn't appeal to emotions, but 
look for arguments of dangerous nature of these projects for mankind’s future. This 
is very H. Jonas who agrees with it, noting that ethics isn't the monopoly of the 
chosen people engaged it professionally. This means there is the need of a wide-
ranged discourse of ethical problems. 
Unlike H. Jonas’ excessively paternalistic type of responsibility, dialogical 
responsibility of communicative ethics is provided by the democratic horizon 
starting point of which is the ethos of reciprocity of mature personalities and the 
regulatory principle of justice foreseeing common responsibility on the basis of 
reasonable consensus. As discursive ethics considers man’s dignity through his 
communicative freedom, it refuses all the attempts to preserve the view of man only 
in the biological dimension. Consequently discursive ethics couldn’t follow 
H. Jonas’ logic of mankind’s preservation basing on his ontological idea, 
nevertheless, H. Jonas’ concept of responsibility within discursive ethics could be 
considered as a debt of preservation of a real communicative community or as a 
condition of possibility of an ideal communicative community. 
Conclusion 
The new concept of responsibility is the answer to crises of the technological 
civilization. The orientation of responsibility to remote, irreversible and cumulative 
consequences of man’s activity causes the change of its temporal horizon 
(responsibility is directed on the remote consequences in the future); its object (it 
includes the entire biosphere in view of principle value of organic life, and also 
future generations); its subject (it represents both an individual and the mankind). 
Scales of critical check and legitimation of man’s activity are defined within a civil 
discourse as an instance which is able to control dangerous projects of experimental 
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